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Abstract
We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by
van Benthem [20]. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not
allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an extension of the sabotage games in which
the first player (Runner) traverses an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second
player (Saboteur). In our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget
that he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to minimise the
quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show that, on the one hand, for most
of the classical cost functions considered in the literature, the problem of determining if Runner
has a strategy to ensure a cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand,
if the budget of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost functions.
Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also leads to better complexity.
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2 Quantitative Games under Failures
1 Introduction
Two-player games played on graphs are nowadays a well-established model for systems where
two antagonistic agents interact. In particular, they allow one to perform controller syn-
thesis [1], when one of the players models the controller, and the second plays the role of an
evil environment. Quantitative generalisations (played on weighted graphs) of these models
have attracted much attention in the last decades [5, 9, 2] as they allow for a finer analysis
of those systems.
In this setting, most results assume that the arena (i.e., the graph) on which the game
is played does not change during the game. There are however many situations where this
restriction is not natural, at least from a modelling point of view. For instance, Grüner et al.
[7] model connectivity problems in dynamic networks (i.e., subject to failure and restoration)
using a variant of sabotage games – a model originally proposed by van Benthem [20] – to
model reachability problems in a network prone to errors. A sabotage game is played on a
directed graph, and starts with a token in an initial vertex. Then, Runner and Saboteur
(the two players of the game) play in alternation: Runner moves the token along one edge
and Saboteur is allowed to remove one edge. Runner wins the game if he reaches a target set
of vertices. In [13], it is shown that deciding the existence of a winning strategy for Runner
is PSPACE-complete.
In those sabotage games, errors are regarded as unrecoverable failures. In practice, this
hypothesis might be too strong. Instead, one might want to model the fact that certain
uncontrollable events incur additional costs (modelling delays, resource usage. . . ), and look
for strategies that allow one to fulfil the game objective at a minimal cost, whatever the
occurrence of uncontrollable events. For instance, if the graph models a railway network,
the failure of a track will eventually be fixed, and, in the meantime, trains might be slowed
down on the faulty portion or diverted, creating delays in the journeys. It is thus natural
to consider quantitative extensions of sabotage games, where Saboteur controls the price of
the actions in the game. This is the aim of the present paper.
More precisely, we extend sabotage games in two directions. First, we consider games
played on weighted graphs. Saboteur is allotted an integral budget B that he can distribute
(dividing it into integral parts) on the edges of the graph, thereby setting their weights. At
each turn, Saboteur can change this distribution by moving k units of budget from an edge
to another edge (for simplicity, we restrict ourselves to k = 1 but our results hold for any
k). Second, we relax the inherent finiteness of sabotage games (all edges will eventually be
deleted), and consider infinite horizon games (i.e., plays are now infinite). In this setting, the
goal of Runner is to minimise the cost defined by the sequence of weights of edges visited,
with respect to some fixed cost function (Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, average or discounted-
sum), while Saboteur attempts to maximise the same cost. We call these games quantitative
sabotage games (QSG, for short).
Let us briefly sketch one potential application of our model, showing that they are useful
to perform synthesis in a dynamic environment. Our application is borrowed from Suzuki
and Yamashita [21] who have considered the problem of motion planning of multiple mobile
robots that interact in a finite space. In essence, each robot executes a “Look-Compute-
Move” cycle and should realise some specification (that we could specify using LTL, for
instance). For simplicity, assume that at every observation (Look) phase, at most one other
robot has moved. Clearly every motion phase (Move) will require different amounts of time
and energy depending on the location of the other robots. We can model the interaction of
each individual robot against all others using a QSG where Runner is one robot, Saboteur
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is the coalition of all other robots, and the budget is equal to the number of robots minus 1.
This model allows one to answer meaningful questions such as ‘what is, in the worst case,
the average delay the robot incurs because of the dynamics of the system?’, or ‘what is the
average amount of additional energy required because of the movements of the other robots?’
using appropriate cost functions.
As a second motivational example, let us recall the motivation of the original Sabotage
Game: consider a situation in which you need to find your way between two cities within a
railway network where a malevolent demon starts cancelling connections? This is called the
real Travelling Salesman Problem by Benthem [20]. However, in real life, railway compan-
ies have contracts with infrastructure companies which ensure that failures in the railway
network are repaired withing a given amount of time (e.g. a service-level agreement). In
this case, it is better to consider delays instead of absolute failures in the network. Further,
salesmen do not usually have one single trip in their whole carriers. For modelling purposes,
one can in fact assume they never stop travelling. In this setting, QSGs can be used to
answer the question: ‘what is, in the worst case, the average delay time incurred by the
salesman’? Our model can be used to treat the same questions for other networks and not
just railway networks.
Related Works & Contributions. Variations of the original sabotage games have been
considered by students of van Benthem. In [12], the authors have considered changing the
reachability objective of Runner to a safety objective, and proved it is PSPACE-complete as
well. They also consider a co-operative variation of the game which, not surprisingly, leads
to a lower complexity: NL-complete. In [17], an asymmetric imperfect information version
of the game is studied—albeit, under the guise of the well-known parlor game Scotland
Yard—and shown to be PSPACE-complete. We remark that although the latter version of
sabotage games already includes some sort of dynamicity in the form of the Scotland Yard
team moving their pawns on the board, both of these studies still focus on inherently finite
versions of the game.
We establish that QSGs are EXPTIME-complete in general. Our approach is to prove
the result for a very weak problem on QSGs, called the safety problem, that asks whether
Runner can avoid ad vitam æternam edges with non-zero budget on it. We remark that
although the safety problem is related to cops and robbers games [1, 6], we were not able to
find EXPTIME-hard variants that reduce easily into our formalism.1 The general problem
being EXPTIME-complete, we consider the case where the budget is fixed instead of left as
an input of the problem (see Corollary 2). We also consider restricting the behaviour of
Saboteur and define a variation of our QSGs in which Saboteur is only allowed to choose an
initial distribution of weights but has to commit to it once he has fixed it. We call this the
static version of the game. For both restrictions, we show that tractable algorithms exist for
some of the cost functions we consider. A summary of the complexity results we establish
in this work is shown in Table 1. In Section 6, we comment on several implications of the
complexity bounds proved in this work.
2 Quantitative sabotage games
Let us now formally define quantitative sabotage games (QSG). We start with the definition
of the cost functions we will consider, then give the syntax and semantics of QSG.
1 We compare to related works on cops and robbers games in Appendix A.
4 Quantitative Games under Failures
Table 1 Complexity results for quantitative sabotage games
QSG static QSG fixed budget QSG
Inf, LimInf ∈ EXPTIME ∈ PTIME ∈ PTIME
Sup, LimSup, Avg EXPTIME-c coNP-c ∈ PTIME
DS EXPTIME-c coNP-c ∈ NP ∩ coNP
Cost functions. A cost function f : Qω → R associates a real number to a sequence of
rationals u = (ui)i>0 ∈ Qω. The six classical cost functions that we consider are
Inf(u) = inf{ui | i > 0};
Sup(u) = sup{ui | i > 0};
LimInf(u) = lim infn→∞{ui | i > n};
LimSup(u) = lim supn→∞{ui | i > n};
Avg(u) = lim infn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=0 ui, which stands for the average cost (also called mean-
payoff in the literature); and
DSλ(u) =
∑∞
i=0 λ
i · ui, (with 0 < λ < 1), stands for discounted-sum.
In the following, we let DS = {DSλ | 0 < λ < 1}.
Syntax. As sketched in the introduction, quantitative sabotage games are played by Runner
and Saboteur on a directed weighted graph, called the arena. A play alternates between
Runner moving the token along the edges and Saboteur modifying the weights. We consider
that Saboteur has a fixed integer budget B that he can distribute on edges, thereby setting
their weights (which must be integer values). Formally, for a finite set E and a budget
B ∈ N, ∆(E,B) denotes the set of all distributions of budget B on E, where a distribution
is a function δ : E → {0, 1, . . . , B} such that ∑e∈E δ(e) 6 B (the last constraint is an
inequality since the whole budget need not be distributed on E). Then, a quantitative
sabotage game is a tuple G = (V,E,B, vI , δI , f), where (V,E) is a directed graph, B ∈ N is
the budget of the game, vI ∈ V is the initial vertex, δI ∈ ∆(E,B) is the initial distribution
of the budget, and f is a cost function. We assume, without loss of generality, that there
are no deadlocks in (V,E), i.e., for all v ∈ V , there is v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E. In the
following, we may alternatively write ∆(G) for ∆(E,B) when G is a QSG with set of edges
E and budget B.
Semantics. To define the semantics of a QSG G, we first formalise the possible redistri-
butions of the budget by Saboteur. We choose to restrict them, reflecting some physical
constraints: Saboteur can move at most one unit of weight in-between two edges. For
δ, δ′ ∈ ∆(G), we say that δ′ is a valid redistribution from δ, noted δ . δ′, if and only if there
are e1, e2 ∈ E such that δ′(e1) ∈ {δ(e1), δ(e1) − 1}, δ′(e2) ∈ {δ(e2), δ(e2) + 1}, and for all
other edges e 6∈ {e1, e2}, δ′(e) = δ(e). Then, a play in a QSG G = (V,E,B, vI , δI , f) is
an infinite sequence pi = v0δ0v1δ1 · · · alternating vertices vi ∈ V and budget distributions
δi ∈ ∆(G) such that (i) v0 = vI ; (ii) δ0 = δI ; and (iii) for all i > 0: (vi, vi+1) ∈ E, and
δi . δi+1. Let Prefs∆(G) denote the set of prefixes of plays ending in a budget distribution,
and PrefsV (G) the set of prefixes of length at least 2 ending in a vertex. We abuse nota-
tions and lift cost functions f to plays letting f(v0δ0v1δ1 · · · ) = f(δ0(v0, v1)δ1(v1, v2) · · · ).
A strategy of Runner is a mapping ρ : Prefs∆(G) → V such that (vn, ρ(pi)) ∈ E for all
pi = v0δ0 · · · vnδn ∈ Prefs∆(G). A strategy of Saboteur is a mapping σ : PrefsV (G) → ∆(G)
such that δn−1 . σ(pi) for all pi = v0δ0 · · · vn−1δn−1vn ∈ PrefsV (G). We denote by ΣRun(G)
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(respectively, ΣSab(G)) the set of all strategies of Runner (respectively, Saboteur). A pair
of strategies (ρ, σ) of Runner and Saboteur defines a unique play piρ,σ = v0δ0v1δ1 · · · such
that for all i > 0: (i) vi+1 = ρ(v0δ0 · · · viδi); and (ii) δi+1 = σ(v0δ0 · · · viδivi+1).
Values and determinacy. We are interested in computing the best value that each player
can guarantee no matter how the other player plays. To reflect this, we define two val-
ues of a QSG G: the superior value (modelling the best value for Runner)as Val(G) :=
supσ∈ΣSab(G) infρ∈ΣRun(G) f(piρ,σ), and the inferior value (modelling the best value for Sabo-
teur) as Val(G) := infρ∈ΣRun(G) supσ∈ΣSab(G) f(piρ,σ). It is folklore to prove that Val(G) 6
Val(G). Indeed, for the previously mentioned cost functions, we can prove that QSGs are
determined, i.e., that Val(G) = Val(G) for all QSGs G. This can be formally proved by
encoding a QSG G into a quantitative two-player game JGK (whose vertices contain both
vertices of G and budget distributions), and then using classical Martin’s determinacy the-
orem [14], as formally done in Appendix B. Val(G) = Val(G) is henceforth called the value
of G, and denoted by Val(G).
1
2
3
Figure 1 A QSG
Example. Consider the simple QSG G in Figure 1, where the budget
of Saboteur is B = 4, and the cost function is Avg. We claim that
whatever the initial configuration, Val(G) = 2. Indeed, consider the
strategy of Saboteur that consists in eventually putting all the budget
on the edge ( 1 , 2 ) (i.e., letting δ( 1 , 2 ) = 4 and δ(e) = 0 for all
other edges e), and then playing as follows: whenever Runner reaches
2 , move one unit of budget from ( 1 , 2 ) to ( 2 , 3 ); if Runner moves
to 3 , move the unit of budget from ( 2 , 3 ) to ( 3 , 1 ); and when Runner moves back to
1 , move all the budget back on ( 1 , 2 ), by consuming one unit either from ( 2 , 3 ) or from
( 3 , 1 ). Let us call this strategy σ. Since we consider the average cost, only the long-term
behaviour of Runner is relevant to compute the cost of a play. So, as soon as Saboteur has
managed to reach a distribution δ such that δ( 1 , 2 ) = 4, the only choices for Runner each
time he visits 1 are either to visit the 1 – 2 – 3 – 1 cycle, or the 1 – 2 – 1 cycle. In the
former case, Runner traverses 3 edges and pays 4+1+1 = 6, hence an average cost of 63 = 2
for this cycle. In the latter, he pays an average of 4+02 = 2 for the cycle. Hence, whatever
the strategy ρ of Runner, we have Avg(piσ,ρ) = 2, which proves that Val(G) > 2. One can
check that the strategy ρ of Runner consisting in always playing the 1 – 2 – 3 – 1 cycle
indeed guarantees cost 2, proving that Val(G) 6 2. This proves that the value Val(G) of
the game is 2.
3 Solving quantitative sabotage games
Given a QSG, our main objective is to determine whether Runner can play in such a way
that he will ensure a cost at most T , no matter how Saboteur plays, and where T is a given
threshold. This amounts to determining whether Val(G) 6 T . Thus, for a cost function
f , the Threshold problem with cost function f consists in determining whether
Val(G) 6 T , given a QSG G with cost function f and a non-negative threshold T . When
f = DS, we assume that the discount factor λ is part of the input. If we want it to be
a parameter of the problem (and not a part of the input), we consider f = DSλ. Our
main contribution is to characterise the complexity of the threshold problem for all the cost
functions introduced before, as summarised in the following theorem:
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I Theorem 1. For cost functions Sup, LimSup, Avg, DS and DSλ, the threshold problem
over QSGs is EXPTIME-complete; for Inf and LimInf, it is in EXPTIME.
For all cost functions, the EXPTIME membership is established by using the encoding
(explained in Appendix B) of a QSG G into a classical quantitative two-player game JGK
which is played on a weighted graph, whose vertices are the configurations of the sabotage
game, i.e., a tuple containing the current vertex, the last crossed edge and the current
weight distribution, and whose weights are in {0, . . . , B} (describing how much runner pays
by moving from one configuration to another). Notice that ∆(G) has size at most (B+1)|E|,
since every distribution is a mapping of E → {0, 1, . . . , B}. Hence, we see that the gameJGK has a number of vertices at most exponential with respect to |V |, and polynomial with
respect to B (which, being given in binary, can be exponential in the size of the input of the
problem). Using results from [23, 2, 1], we know that we can compute in pseudo-polynomial
time the value of the quantitative game JGK for all the cost functions cited in the theorem:
here, pseudo-polynomial means polynomial with respect to the number of vertices and edges
of JGK (which is exponential with respect to |V |), and polynomial with respect to the greatest
weight in absolute value, here B (which is also exponential with respect to |V |). Thus we
obtain the exponential time upper bound announced in the theorem. Note that for DSλ,
pseudo-polynomial also means polynomial in the value of the denominator of λ.2
When the budget B is fixed, i.e., when it is a parameter of the problem and not one of
the inputs, the explanation above can be adapted to prove that the problem is solvable in
polynomial time for all but the DSλ cost functions. Indeed, we can refine our analysis of the
size of ∆(G). A budget distribution can also be encoded as a mapping γ : {1, . . . , B} → E
where we consider the budget as a set of indexed pebbles: such a mapping represents the
distribution δ defined by δ(e) = |γ−1(e)|. This encoding shows that ∆(G) has size at most
|E|B , which is polynomial in |E|. For the discounted sum, the role of λ in the complexity
stays the same, causing an NP ∩ coNP and pseudo-polynomial complexity: this blow-up
disappears if λ is a parameter of the problem. In the overall, we obtain:
I Corollary 2. For cost functions Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, Avg, DSλ, and for fixed budget
B, the threshold problem for QSGs is in PTIME; for DS (where λ is an input), it is in
NP ∩ coNP and can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of EXPTIME-hardness in Theorem 1 for
cost functions Sup, LimSup, Avg and DSλ (this implies EXPTIME-hardness for DS too). Our
gold-standard problem for EXPTIME-hardness is the alternating Boolean formula (ABF)
problem, introduced by Stockmeyer and Chandra in [19]. Our proof consists of a sequence
of reductions from this problem, as depicted in Figure 2. First, we show a reduction to the
threshold problem for Sup cost function when the threshold is 0 and the initial distribu-
tion is empty (i.e., no budget on any edge), on QSGs extended with safe edges and final
vertices (in order to make the reduction more readable). Notice that this problem amounts to
determining whether Runner has a strategy to avoid crossing an edge with non-zero budget,
therefore we refer to this problem as the extended safety problem (ESPr). Our next step is
to encode safe edges and final vertices into (non-extended) QSGs with gadgets of polynomial
size, therefore proving that the safety problem (SPr) is itself EXPTIME-hard: SPr is a special
case of the threshold problem ThPrSup(0) with Sup cost function and threshold 0, for empty
2 In case of discounted-sum, we design JGK with a discount factor √λ (not necessarily rational), but we
ensure that only one turn over two has a non-zero weight, so that we may indeed apply the reasoning
of [23] and their pseudo-polynomial algorithm.
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ABF ESPr SPr
ThPrSup(0)
ThPrSup
ThPrDSλ(0)
ThPrDSλ
ThPrLimSup(0)
ThPrLimSup
ThPrMP(0)
ThPrMP
Lem. 4 Lem. 5
Lem. 6
Lem. 7
Lem. 8
Figure 2 Reductions used in this section. We denote by ThPrf (respectively, ThPrf (0)) the
threshold problem (respectively, the sub-problem of the threshold problem where threshold is 0)
for QSGs with cost function f . Non-trivial reductions are labelled with the corresponding lemma
stated in this section.
initial distributions. Reductions to threshold problems with other cost functions close our
discussion to prove their EXPTIME-hardness.
Alternating Boolean Formula. We first recall the alternating Boolean formula problem
(ABF) introduced as game G6 in [19], which is the EXPTIME-hard problem from which
we perform our reductions. Intuitively, an ABF is an (infinite) game played on a Boolean
formula whose variables are partitioned into two sets. Each player controls the values of
one of the sets of variables. Players take turns changing the value of one of the variables
they control. The objective of the first player (Prover) is to eventually make the formula
true, while the second player (Disprover) tries to avoid this. We note that this game closely
resembles an infinite horizon version of the more classical QBF Problem.
More formally, an ABF instance is given by two finite disjoint sets of Boolean variables,
X and Y , and a CNF formula over X ∪Y . The game is played by two players called Prover
and Disprover. They take turns changing the value of at most one of the variables they own
(X are the variables of Prover, and Y those of Disprover). Prover wins if and only if the
formula is eventually true. A configuration of this game is thus a pair (val,Player) where
val is the current valuation of the variables and Player indicates which player should play
next. The ABF problem consists in, given an ABF game and an initial configuration,
determining whether Disprover has a winning strategy from the initial configuration. It is
shown EXPTIME-complete in [19].
I Example 3. Consider the formula Φ = Cl1 ∧ Cl2 ∧ Cl3 ∧ Cl4 where Cl1 = A ∨ ¬C,
Cl2 = C ∨ D, Cl3 = C ∨ ¬D and Cl4 = B ∨ ¬B. Let us further consider the partition of
the variables into the sets X = {A,B} of Prover, and Y = {C,D} of Disprover; and the
initial configuration (val,Prover), where val = {B,C,D} (we denote a valuation by the set
of all variables it sets to true). Clearly, in this initial configuration, Φ is false since Cl1 is
false. From that configuration, Prover can either set A to true, or B to false. In the former
case, one obtains the configuration ({A,B,C,D},Disprover), where Prover wins, as Φ now
evaluates to true. In the latter case, one obtains the configuration ({C,D},Disprover). We
claim that, from this configuration, Prover cannot win the game anymore, i.e., Disprover
has a winning strategy that consists in first setting C to false, and in, all subsequent rounds,
always flipping the value of D, whatever Prover does. Playing according to this strategy
ensures Disprover to force visiting only configurations where either Cl2 or Cl3 is false.
Extended QSG. To make the encoding of ABF instances into QSG easier, we introduce
extended quantitative sabotage games (with Sup cost function). Those games are QSG with
Sup cost function, a designated subset F ⊆ V of final vertices and a designated subset S ⊆ E
of safe edges (those special vertices and edges are henceforth depicted with double lines).
8 Quantitative Games under Failures
¬x(1) ¬x(2) x(1) x(2)
{¬x(1),¬x(2), x(1)}(1) {¬x(2), x(1), x(2)}(1)
{¬x(1),¬x(2), x(1)}(2) {¬x(2), x(1), x(2)}(2)
{¬x(1),¬x(2), x(2)}(1) {¬x(1), x(1), x(2)}(1)
{¬x(1),¬x(2), x(2)}(2) {¬x(1), x(1), x(2)}(2)
Figure 3 Verifying condition (i)
¬x(1) ¬x(2) x(1) x(2)
{¬x(1), x(1)} {¬x(1), x(2)}
{¬x(2), x(1)} {¬x(2), x(2)}
Figure 4 Verifying condition (ii)
F and S influence the semantics of the game: Saboteur can place some budget on final
vertices (which is accounted for in the cost when Runner visits those vertices), but cannot
put budget on safe edges; and the game stops as soon as Runner visits a final vertex. We
consider the extended safety problem (ESPr), which is to determine whether an extended
QSG G with empty initial distribution has value Val(G) 6 0.
Since the cost function is Sup, this amounts to checking that Runner has a strategy to
reach a final vertex, with no budget assigned to it, without crossing any edge with non-null
budget. From now on, we assume B < |E|, as the problem is trivial otherwise. Then:
I Lemma 4. The ABF problem is polynomial-time reducible to ESPr.
Sketch. We consider an instance of the ABF problem given by Boolean variable sets X and
Y (owned by Prover and Disprover, respectively) and a CNF formula Φ over X ∪ Y . We
construct an extended QSG E such that Saboteur wins in E if and only if Prover wins in the
ABF problem. Valuations of the variables in X ∪ Y are encoded by budget distributions
in E . For each variable x ∈ X ∪ Y , E has 4 final vertices associated with x, Ver(x) =
{¬x(1),¬x(2), x(1), x(2)}. A budget distribution δ encodes a valuation in which variable
x ∈ X ∪ Y is true if and only if δ(x(1)) = δ(x(2)) = 1 and δ(¬x(1)) = δ(¬x(2)) = 0.
Then, E simulates the ABF game as follows. The duty of Saboteur is to move the budget
distribution in such a way that he respects the encoding of the valuations explained above.
To enforce this, we rely on the two gadgets, depicted in Figure 3 and 4. They allow Runner
to check that Saboteur respects the encoding and let him lose if he does not. More precisely,
the gadget in Figure 3 allows one to check that (i) there is a non-zero budget on at least
two vertices from Ver(x); and the one in Figure 4 that (ii) there is a non-zero budget on
exactly {¬x(1),¬x(2)} or {x(1), x(2)}. To allow Runner to check one of these conditions, we
allow him to move to one of the four corner vertices of the corresponding gadget, from where
one can easily check Runner can win if and only if the condition is not respected. In our
reduction, Runner will be allowed to check condition (i), for all variables, from all vertices
but will be able to check (ii) only on some of them, as we will see later.
The remaining of the construction is done in a way to allow Saboteur and Runner to
choose valid re-configurations of Ver(x) for all variables x, and make sure that if a player
cheats, it allows the other player to win the safety game. If at some point, the formula Φ
becomes true, then we allow Saboteur to enter a final gadget which verifies that the current
budget distribution to Ver(X) =
⋃
x∈X∪Y Ver(x) satisfies Φ. This last gadget lets Runner
choose a clause and then allows Saboteur to choose a literal, within this clause, which should
be true. It is easy to see that the choice of clause Cl can be done by way of safe edges. The
choice of literal, done by Saboteur, consists in choosing a suffix of Cl for which the left-most
literal holds. Figure 5 shows the ESPr which results from applying our construction to the
ABF formula from Example 3. We refer the reader to Appendix C.1 for the full reduction, in
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¬A(1) ¬A(2) A(1) A(2) ¬B(1) ¬B(2) B(1) B(2) ¬C(1) ¬C(2) C(1) C(2) ¬D(1) ¬D(2) D(1) D(2)
Verif
ABCDα
P lay
ABCDα
Choose
ABCD
set(2)
ABCDα
set(1)
ABα
set
(1)
¬A
BCDα
set
(2)
¬A
ABCDα
set
(1)
A
BCDα
set
(2)
A
ABCDα
set
(1)
¬B
ACDα
set
(2)
¬B
ABCDα
set
(1)
B
ACDα
set
(2)
B
ABCDα
Cl1
ABCD
Cl2
ABCD
Cl3
ABCD
Cl4
ABCD
α
Figure 5 Excerpt of the ESPr constructed from the ABF of Example 3. In addition to these
nodes and edges, the full ESPr contains: an initialisation gadget; a safe edge from a node n to all
four corner nodes of gadget (i) in Figure 3 iff n is labeled by α; and a safe edge from a node n to all
four corner nodes of gadget (ii) in Figure 4 testing variable x ∈ {A,B,C,D} iff n is labeled by x.
These parts have been omitted for the sake of clarity.
particular how we can force, before the beginning of the actual game, to start in the initial
valuation of the ABF game. J
We now explain how to encode safe edges and final vertices into usual QSGs, therefore
showing the EXPTIME-hardness of the safety problem for QSGs.
I Lemma 5. The extended safety problem ESPr is polynomial-time reducible to a safety
problem SPr with budget 2.
Sketch. Each final vertex v in an extended QSG E is replaced by the gadget in Figure 6a,
where {αi | 1 6 i 6 B + 1} is a clique of size B + 1, hence bigger than the budget of
Saboteur. To encode δ(v) = 1 in E , Saboteur now puts one unit of budget on ( A , C1 ). If
Runner reaches the gadget (through A ), Saboteur puts one unit of budget on ( A , C2 ).
Clearly, Runner loses if and only if there was already one unit on ( A , C1 ) (i.e., v was
marked in E). Each safe edge ( A , C ) is replaced by the gadget in Figure 6b. Here, we
make use of final vertices and disjoint paths so that Saboteur cannot block all paths from
A to C without letting Runner win by visiting a final vertex with zero budget. Both
gadgets have polynomial size since we assume that B < |E|. J
As the safety problem is a specific case of the threshold problem for Sup QSGs (where
the initial distribution is empty, and threshold is fixed to 0), it follows that ThPrSup(0) and
ThPrSup are EXPTIME-hard too.
We note that given a QSG G, for all plays pi in G, for all 0 < λ < 1, and for all δ ∈ ∆(G),
Sup(pi) = 0 if and only if DSλ(pi) = 0. This implies the following result, showing that
ThPrDSλ(0) and ThPrDSλ are also EXPTIME-hard.
I Lemma 6. For any λ ∈ (0, 1), the threshold problem for DSλ and threshold 0 is equivalent
to the threshold problem for Sup and threshold 0.
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A
C2
C1
α1
...
αB+1
(a) A gadget for final vertices
A
E1 . . . Ei . . . EB+1
C
F1 . . . Fi . . . FB+1
(b) A gadget for safe edges
post(vI)
e1 e2 e3 . . . eB eB+1
f1 f2 . . . fB
(c) Initial gadget for Sup to LimSup reduction.
G(I)
xB+1
...
xB′
t1
t2
si1
...
siB′+1
e1
...
eB+1
(d) Exit gadget for Sup to LimSup reduction.
Dashed arrows represent a (safe) path traversing
B′ sets si of vertices.
Figure 6 Dotted arrows represent edges from all sources to all targets.
Let us now focus on LimSup. To show that ThPrLimSup is EXPTIME-hard, we describe a
reduction from SPr to ThPrLimSup(0) as stated in the following lemma.
I Lemma 7. The safety problem SPr is polynomial-time reducible to the threshold problem
for LimSup and threshold 0.
Sketch. Let I = (V,E,B, vI , δI , Sup) be an instance of SPr (with G(I) its underlying graph
(V,E)). We build a QSG G with cost function LimSup such that Val(G) = 0 if and only if
Runner wins in I. The idea of the construction is that a play of G consists in simulating
a potentially infinite sequence of plays of I, using appropriate gadgets to ‘reset’ the safety
game between two successive simulations. Then, repeatedly playing a winning strategy for
I allows Runner to ensure a LimSup of 0 in G; and one can extract a winning strategy for
the safety game I from any strategy ensuring a LimSup of 0 in G. The QSG G has budget
B′ = |E| and is obtained by extending G(I) with two gadgets. Note that we are giving
Saboteur more budget than he had in I. However, as we will see in the sequel, at the
beginning of every faithful simulation of I (i.e. when Runner moves to G(I)) there will be
B′ −B of it in the second gadget and B in the first and during any faithful simulation of I
only budget from the initial gadget is redistribtued into G(I).
The first gadget is an initial gadget which is visited every time the safety game is ‘reset’.
It allows Runner to stay safe from any weighted edges (and avoid reaching G(I)) until
Saboteur has placed B units of budget on it (and thus removed them from the G(I). It is
depicted in Figure 6c, where all ei are intuitively copies of vI , and post(vI) corresponds to
the set of all successors of vI in G(I).
The second gadget allows Runner to leave G(I) if Saboteur ever places more than B
units of budget on G(I) (and thus removes this budget from the gadgets), thereby triggering
a ‘reset’ of the simulation. This gadget, depicted in Figure 6d, also allows Runner to come
back to the initial gadget visiting only edges with zero budget. The figure shows a sequence
of safe transitions (i.e. several vertices with high out-degree) which leads back to the copies ei
of the initial vertex. Further, this ‘safe path’ takes long enough for Saboteur to redistribute
the budget from G(I) to both gadgets. In order for Saboteur to stop Runner from always
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taking this ‘safe exit’ from G(I) he can place B′−B budget in specific edges of this second
gadget. More specifically, he can place a unit of budget on one outgoing edge from each xj ,
for B + 1 6 j 6 B′, before forcing Runner to enter G(I).
Intuition behind the global construction. Assume that Saboteur has a winning strategy
in I. Then, when Runner is in the initial gadget, Saboteur will play as expected and remove
all weights from G(I). Critically, the weights he removes from G(I) will go to specific edges
in both gadgets described above. Runner is now forced to play into G(I), and Saboteur
can follow his winning strategy to hit Runner at some point without using more than B
weights. If Runner attempts to bail out of G through the alternative exit, and to head back
to the initial gadget, then we make sure he is also hit by Saboteur. Clearly, this ensures
that the LimSup value of the game is strictly greater than 0. Now assume that Runner has a
winning strategy in I. In this case, if Saboteur does not remove all weights from G(I), then
Runner is allowed to stay in the initial gadget forever or jump to G(I) and immediately bail
out using the exit gadget. In both cases he avoids getting hit by Saboteur. Let us assume
Saboteur plays as expected and thus Runner enters G(I) eventually. In this case, Runner
can play his winning strategy, hence avoiding edges with non-zero budget (with Saboteur
using budget B). Either he dodges weighted edges forever, or Saboteur cheats and uses
some of his additional budget. However, in this case he creates an exit for Runner back to
the initial gadget, and the same analysis as above applies. This implies that the value of
the game is exactly 0. J
Proving the EXPTIME-hardness result for cost function Avg is done by noticing that, for
threshold 0, both problems are equivalent.
I Lemma 8. The threshold problem for LimSup and threshold 0 is polynomial-time reducible
to the threshold problem for Avg and threshold 0.
4 Static quantitative sabotage games
In light of the EXPTIME-completeness of QSGs, we study in this section a restriction of the
problem, that might be sufficient to model some interesting cases. The restriction concerns
the dynamics of the behaviour of Saboteur. In a static QSG, Saboteur chooses at the
beginning a budget distribution (hence, changing the initial budget distribution), and then
commits to this distribution during the whole game. The situation is no longer a reactive
two-player game, but rather we ask whether for every possible initial (and static) budget
distribution, Runner has a nicely behaved strategy.
Formally, for a QSG G = (V,E,B, vI , f) (we remove the initial budget distribution from
the tuple in this section, since it is useless) and a budget distribution δ ∈ ∆(G), we denote
by Gδ the QSG obtained from G by taking δ as initial budget distribution. Furthermore,
we define the identity strategy ι of Saboteur in G, as the strategy mapping every prefix
pi ∈ PrefsSab(G) to the last budget distribution appearing in prefix pi. We let Valstat(G) =
supδ∈∆(G) infρ∈ΣRun(G) f(piδρ,ι), where piδρ,ι denotes the unique play defined by the profile
(ρ, ι) in QSG Gδ. Notice that this value is equal to infρ∈ΣRun(G) supδ∈∆(G) f(piδρ,ι), since in G,
when Saboteur follows strategy ι, the quantitative game JGK (see Appendix B) is split into
independent games, one for each initial distribution δ, that Runner knows as soon as it starts
playing. The Static Threshold problem with cost function f consists in, given as
input a QSG G with cost function f and a non-negative threshold T , determining whether
the inequality Valstat(G) 6 T holds. We now state the complexity of this new problem.
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I Theorem 9. For cost functions Inf and LimInf, the static threshold problem over QSGs is
in PTIME; for Sup, LimSup, Avg, and DS, it is coNP-complete.
First, we give the intuition behind our polynomial-time algorithm to decide the static
threshold problem for cost functions Inf and LimInf.
I Lemma 10. For cost functions Inf and LimInf, the static threshold problem over QSGs is
in PTIME.
Sketch. For Inf, we claim that Valstat(G) = b|E|/Bc, where E is the set of edges reachable
from vI . Indeed once a distribution δ is chosen, any optimal strategy of Runner will make
him reach an edge of E that has the minimum weight, thus Saboteur must distribute evenly
its budget over E. A similar argument works for LimInf, showing that Valstat(G) = b|E˜|/Bc,
where E˜ is the set of edges reachable from vI and contained in a strongly connected com-
ponent. J
Then, let us turn to the coNP-completeness of the problem for cost functions Sup, LimSup,
Avg, and DS. Notice that, because of the two possible definitions of Valstat(G) explained in
the beginning of the section, the complement of the static threshold problem asks whether
there exists a budget distribution δ such that f(piδρ,ι) > T for every strategy ρ ∈ ΣRun(G)
of Runner. Thus we show the NP-completeness of the complement of the static threshold
problems for the four cost functions.
I Lemma 11. For cost functions Sup, LimSup, Avg, and DS, the complement of the static
threshold problem over QSGs is NP-complete.
Sketch. For the membership in NP, we can first guess a budget distribution δ (that is of size
polynomial), and then compute the value of the one-player (since player Max has no choices
anymore) quantitative game Gδ, to check if it is greater than T : computing the value of such
a game can be done in polynomial time for the four cost functions we consider (see [1]).
For the NP-hardness with cost functions LimSup and Avg, we give a reduction from
the following problem. The Feedback arc set problem asks, given a directed graph
G = (V,E) and a threshold k 6 |E|, whether there is a set E′ of at most k edges of G
such that (V,E \ E′) is acyclic. Karp showed [10] that the feedback arc set problem is NP-
complete. Let us consider an instance of the feedback arc set problem, given by a directed
graph G = (V,E) and a natural integer k 6 |E|. Wlog, we can add to the graph a vertex
vI , with null in-degree, and, for all vertices v 6= vI , an edge (vI , v). Observe that this does
not change the output of the feedback arc set problem as vI is not included in any cycle.
We then construct a QSG G = (V,E, k, vI , f) with f ∈ {LimSup,Avg}. It is not difficult
to show that Valstat(G) > 0 if and only if there exists a set E′ of k edges of G such that
(V,E \E′) is acyclic. The result for Sup and DS is then obtained by a slight modification of
the previous proof. In particular, we make use of Lemma 6, once more. We refer the reader
to Appendix D.2 for the details. J
5 Reactive systems under failure
One can see a sabotage game as a system in which a controller tries to evolve while avoiding
as much as possible the failures caused by the environment. The vertices of the graph
represent configurations of the system, edges represent the actions, and the budget of the
Saboteur may represent a finite amount of failures that can simultaneously occur during the
execution. In a quantitative reasoning, a failure may be better represented by a quantity
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describing how much some elements of the system are overloaded, and then how much it
would cost, in terms of time or energy, to use them.
Following this main motivation, we propose to look at sabotage games as a particular
semantics of controllable systems. Indeed, while a standard semantics would analyse the
feasibility of a requirement in a fully functional system, a sabotage semantics allows one to
analyse systems subject to errors, and to decide, e.g., whether one can satisfy a Boolean
constraint while minimising the average number of failures encountered during the execution.
In particular, sabotage games, as introduced in this work, would correspond to the sabotage
semantics of a system where the controller must walk in a graph with no particular objective,
other than minimising the failures.
From a modelling point of view, graphs—which can be viewed as one-player games with
trivial winning conditions—are quite limited. In more realistic models, we may be interested
in modelling systems with uncontrollable actions (i.e., two-player games), and where the
controller has a specific Boolean goal to achieve, instead of simply staying in the graph ad
vitam æternam. A more realistic goal is usually expressed via a parity condition or LTL
formulas. In Appendix E, we show that when a reactive system is modelled by a two-player
parity game, deciding whether one can ensure the parity condition, while maintaining a cost
associated with the sabotage semantics below a given threshold, is not harder than solving
sabotage games. That is, the problem is EXPTIME-complete. This result is obtained by a
reduction to quantitative parity games [3]. When the requirement is expressed with an LTL
formula instead of a parity condition, the problem becomes 2-EXPTIME-complete, due to
an additional exponential blow-up in the size of the input formula. Note, however, that the
LTL-reactive synthesis problem itself (with the standard non-sabotage semantics) is already
2-EXPTIME-complete. In this case, the sabotage semantics does not add to the complexity
of the problem, which further shows that our present contributions might have practical
applications, albeit the high complexity.
6 Conclusion
We have conducted a study of systems subject to failure, using the model of quantitative
sabotage games. We have shown that under dynamic sabotage, the threshold problem is
EXPTIME-complete for most objective functions, and coNP-complete under static sabotage,
for the same functions (see table 1 for a summary of these results). We have also shown the
applicability of our framework to deal with the more general problem of reactive synthesis
in systems under failures. The QSGs we have introduced open many questions related to
evolving structures. Here we have studied the worst-case scenario, i.e., where the environ-
ment is modelled by an antagonistic adversary, but, as considered in [11] for reachability
Boolean objectives, one could also look at a probabilistic model, where failures, i.e., redis-
tributions of weights, are random variables. Another natural extension of this work would
be to consider a more realistic setting where the controller (Runner) has partial information
regarding the weights of Saboteur.
Although the synthesis problem has been widely studied in theory, there are not many
tools which implement the known theoretical solutions to decide it. The is is particularly
true for quantitative objectives. Recently, however, competitions have been organised to
encourage the development of such tools and the standardisation of an input format (see,
e.g., SYNTCOMP and SyGuS).3 Motivated by the similarities between the ABF problem
3 Links to both competitions’ websites: http://www.syntcomp.org and http://www.sygus.org/.
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(solving a safety game described by a logical formula) and the synthesis problem as solved
in those competition (solving a safety game described by a logical circuit), one of our future
projects is to show that quantitative extensions of some of the practical tools implemented
for the reactive synthesis problem could be used to solve sabotage games.
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A Relation with cops and robbers game
We observe that the result on safety games is related to the Cops and Robbers games studied mostly by the
graph theoretical community (see, e.g., [1] and references therein for a survey). We remark that Cops and
Robbers games are usually defined as played on the vertices of undirected graphs. In [6] it was shown that
several variants of the Cops and Robbers game without helicopters and, as usual, played on the vertices of an
undirected graph, are EXPTIME-complete. In contrast, our result implies that the Cops and Robbers game
played on the edges of a graph with B cops, one helicopter and a slow robber, i.e., which can traverse at most
one edge per turn, is EXPTIME-hard. A similar version is studied in [18], where they consider helicopters and
a fast robber. However, the game is played on the vertices of an undirected graph and the complexity of solving
the game is left open in that paper. It is easy to lift our results to games where weights are placed on vertices
and no longer on edges by considering line graphs: in contrast, the other direction from vertices to edges would
have been more difficult, and is not currently known for the best of our knowledge.
B Encoding of quantitative sabotage games in quantitative games
In this section, we give formal definitions of quantitative two-player games, and show an exponential encoding of
QSGs into these games. Thereafter, we choose to call Min and Max the two players of our games, to distinguish
them from Runner and Saboteur, used in the main part of this article.
B.1 Two-player games
A weighted arena is a tuple G = (VMin, VMax, E, w, vI) with V = VMin unionmulti VMax a finite set of vertices partitioned
into the set VMin of vertices of player Min and the set VMax of vertices of player Max, E ⊆ V 2 is a set of edges,
w : E → N is a weight function assigning an integer weight to each edge of the arena, and vI ∈ V is an initial
vertex. Given a weight function w : E → R, we write |w| for the greatest weight in w, i.e., |w| = maxe∈E w(e).
Intuitively, the two players Min and Max move a token along the edges of the graph (V,E), starting on
vertex vI . When the token is on a vertex of VMin, it is Min that chooses the next vertex, and when on VMax,
it is Max. To allow them to play infinitely, we make the assumption that every vertex v has an outgoing
edge, i.e., that there exists (v, v′) ∈ E. A strategy for a player is simply a mapping telling him what to play
depending on the past. Formally, given an arena G = (VMin, VMax, E), a play is an infinite sequence of vertices
v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω such that v0 = vI , and (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i > 0. We say that a prefix v0 · · · vk of a play
belongs to Min (respectively, Max) if vk ∈ VMin (respectively, vk ∈ VMax). A strategy for player p is a mapping
σ from prefixes of plays belonging to p to vertices such that (vk, σ(v0 · · · vk)) ∈ E for all prefix v0 · · · vk belonging
to p. The outcomes of a strategy σ of player p are all plays v0v2 · · · such that for all v0 · · · vk with vk ∈ Vp,
vk+1 = σ(v0 · · · vk). We write Play(G) the set of plays in G (we omit G when it is clear from the context), Play(σ)
the set of outcomes of a strategy σ, and Play(σMin, σMax) the only play contained in Play(σMin) ∩ Play(σMax).
Since we are dealing with quantitative game, we use a value function to map plays to values in R = Runionmulti{+∞}.
A quantitative game is a pair (G, f) consisting of an arena G and such a value function f . Most standard value
functions are defined by using the weights in the weighted arena: equipped of one of the cost functions f : Rω → R
described in the main part of the article (Inf, LimInf, Sup, LimSup, Avg, or DSλ for instance), we may define a
value function fw by setting fw(v0v2 · · · ) = f(w(v0, v1)w(v1, v2) · · · ) for all plays v0v1 · · · .
In a quantitative game (G, f), the value of a strategy σMin (respectively, σMax) of Min (respectively, Max)
is:
Val((G, f), σMin) = sup
pi∈Play(σMin)
f(pi), Val((G, f), σMax) = inf
pi∈Play(σMax)
f(pi).
To characterise the best value that each player can guarantee no matter what the opponent is doing, we consider
the upper value Val (the best Min can hope for) and lower value Val (the best Max can hope for), defined by:
Val(G, f) = inf
σMin
Val((G, f), σMin), Val(G, f) = sup
σMax
Val((G, f), σMax).
I Proposition 12. In quantitative games, for all the value functions fw obtained by considering the cost functions
f used above, upper and lower values coincide: we then let Val(G, f) = Val(G, f) = Val(G, f) be the value of
the game.
Proof. We rely on Martin’s determinacy theorem for Blackwell games [15], since all the cost functions considered
are Borel measurable. J
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B.2 Encoding of quantitative sabotage games
Starting from a QSG G = (V,E,B, vI , δI , f), we encode it in the quantitative two-player game JGK = ((V cMin, V cMax,
Ec, w, vcI), f ′w) as follows:
V cMin = V × ∆(G), V cMax = E × ∆(G): Min vertices represent configurations of G (i.e., the vertex of G
currently occupied by Runner, together with the current budget distribution), and Max vertices encode the
last edge played by Runner in G and again the current budget distribution;
Ec = {((v, δ), (e, δ)) | e = (v, v′) ∈ E} ∪ {((e, δ), (v′, δ′)) | e = (v, v′) ∧ δ . δ′};
for all e = (v, v′) ∈ E and δ, δ′ ∈ ∆(G) we let w((v, δ), (e, δ)) = δ(e) and
w
(
(e, δ), (v′, δ′)
)
= 0 if f = DSλ,
w
(
(e, δ), (v′, δ′)
)
= δ(e) otherwise;
vcI = (vI , δI) is the initial configuration;
if f = DSλ, we let f ′ = DS√λ, otherwise f ′ = f .
We claim that G and JGK are equivalent, meaning that they have the same value. The main difference lies in
the way costs are computed. Indeed, consider a pair of consecutive moves from both players in the original QSG
G, i.e., the traversal of an edge e = (v, v′) by Runner, followed by a budget redistribution δ . δ′ by Saboteur.
Observe that this pair of moves incurs a cost of δ(e) in the original QSG, but is encoded by the traversal of two
consecutive edges
(
(v, δ), (e, δ)
)
and
(
(e, δ), (v′, δ′)
)
in JGK that have both weight δ(e) (or weight δ(e) and then
weight 0 for the discounted sum case). Observe however that this is not a problem for the cost functions that
we are considering. Indeed, Sup, Inf, LimSup, and LimInf are resistant to stuttering. The value of the average
cost is also consistent, since both the sum of the visited weights and the length of the paths are doubled in JGK
with respect to G. For the discounted sum, this is taken care of by replacing the original discount factor λ in G
by
√
λ in JGK.
C Proofs of Section 3
C.1 Reduction from ABF to ESPr: proof of Lemma 4
In this section, we fix an instance of the ABF problem, i.e., a CNF formula Φ and an initial configuration
(val0,Player0). We let N be the number of variables in Φ. We construct an extended QSG G such that Saboteur
wins in the extended safety problem over G if and only if Prover wins the ABF game. Therefore, Saboteur
will act as Prover while Runner will act as Disprover. As an example of our construction, we consider the
CNF formula of Example 3. Recall that in extended QSGs, we allow for the use of safe edges, i.e., edges where
Saboteur cannot put budget, and final vertices, i.e., vertices where the play ends, with the budget placed on
this vertex taken into account to compute the cost. We present step by step the vertices contained in G. For
every variable X, we create 4 final vertices Ver(X) = {¬X(1),¬X(2), X(1), X(2)}. We also create another final
vertex called α. In the following, we always assume that edges are safe, unless explicitly stated.
Forcing to have at least budget 2 on Ver(X)
For each variable X, and each triplet t = {v1, v2, v3} ⊂ Ver(X), we create two vertices, t(1) and t(2) such that
in the graph, (t(1), t(2)), (t(2), vi) ∈ E for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that if there is zero budget on the triplet t when
Runner arrives in t(1), then Runner is sure to reach one of the vi without visiting edges with non-zero budget
(and hence win the game). For all vertices v in the graph (except those in the initialisation gadget, as we see
later), all variables X and all triplets t as described above, we create an edge (v, t). If at some point in the game
there is a variable X such that there are less than 2 vertices in Ver(X) with a budget on them, then Runner is
sure to win the game. This gadget is depicted in Figure 3. In the following, we assume that Saboteur always
place at least 2 units of budget on each Ver(X). We also assume that if it is the case, then Runner does not go
on a t(1) vertex (indeed he will be sure to lose the play if he does so). Saboteur always places at least 2 units of
budget on each Ver(X). We also assume that if it is the case, then Runner does not go on a t(1) vertex (indeed
he will be sure to lose the play if he does so).
The budget in the game is B = 2N + 1. Let v be a vertex that has an outgoing edge towards α. When
Runner leaves v, in order for Saboteur not to lose, there must be one unit of budget on α and exactly 2 units
of budget on each Ver(X).
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Forcing the budget to be well distributed
Now we present another gadget that allows Runner to force, on some vertices, that (?) either ¬X(1) and
¬X(2) have one unit of budget each, or X(1) and X(2) have one unit of budget each. To do so, for each pair
p = {¬X(i), X(j)}, we construct a vertex p that has two outgoing edges, (p,¬X(i)) and (p,X(j)). Let v be a
vertex that has outgoing edges toward each of those p vertices. When Runner leaves v, if property (?) is not
fulfilled, then there is a pair p = {¬X(i), X(j)} with zero budget on it. By going on p, Runner ensures to reach
one of those vertices without budget, hence to win the game. We let Check(X) be the set of all those vertices
associated with X, and we will describe later which vertices have outgoing edges toward Check(X). This gadget
is depicted in Figure 4. When Runner leaves a vertex v with an outgoing edge toward Check(X), we now assume
that Saboteur has made true property (?) for X, so that Runner never goes to Check(X) (indeed he will be
sure to lose if he does so when (?) is fulfilled).
Let v be a vertex that is connected to α and to all vertices of Check(X) for all X (we let Check =⋃
X∈Var Check(X)). When Runner leaves v, in order for Saboteur not to lose, there must be one unit of
budget on α, and one unit of budget either on ¬X(1) and ¬X(2), or on X(1) and X(2), for all X. We call
such a configuration a valid one, and remark that there is an immediate bijection from valid configurations and
valuations of the variables of the CNF formula. We call a valid vertex a vertex connected to α and to Check.
Initialising the game
We add a gadget, at the beginning of the game, forcing Saboteur to distribute the budget accordingly to
the initial valuation val0 of the ABF game. The gadget works as follows: Runner crosses 2N + 1 safe edges
successively, and then goes on a vertex v that has edges towards each vertex of the required initial configuration.
Saboteur has the time to put the required units of budget on this configuration, and is forced to do so, otherwise
Runner would be able to reach a final vertex. Therefore, we are sure that once this gadget is left to start playing
the game, the configuration is indeed the required one. From vertex v, there is also another safe edge going
either to the vertex Play or to the vertex set(1) (the role of both vertices is explained later), depending on
whether Player0 is Disprover or Prover, respectively.
Structure of the graph
From the CNF formula of Example 3, we construct the graph depicted in Figure 5. For the sake of clarity,
we omit the gadgets introduced above. Double bordered vertices represent final vertices, and double arrows
represent safe edges. As stated above, from all vertices depicted here, gadget of Figure 3 is used to check that
Ver(X) contains at least budget 2, for all variables X. The subscript in {A,B,C,D, α} on vertices depicts an
edge from the vertex to the corresponding gadget Check, or vertex α.
Saboteur modifies Prover’s variables
The two safe vertices set(1) and set(2) describe Prover’s turn to modify one of its variables. Both vertices have
an outgoing edge towards α ensuring that one pebble is left on it. set(2) is a valid vertex, and set(1) is connected
to Check(X) for all variables X belonging to Disprover. Finally, there is an edge (set(1), set(2)) connecting
those two vertices.
Let v be a valid vertex with an outgoing edge set(1) and let val1 be the valuation of variables induced by a
valid configuration at the moment Runner leaves v. If Runner goes to the vertex set(1) and then to set(2), let
val2 be the valuation induced by the valid configuration at the moment Runner leaves set(2). We claim that
between val2 and val1, at most one variable of Prover has been modified. Indeed after Runner has arrived in
set(1), Saboteur cannot remove the budget on α, and he cannot take the budget on some Ver(X) to put it on
another Ver(X ′), with X ′ 6= X, as there would be only budget 1 on Ver(X) and Runner would win. Therefore,
the only possible move for Saboteur is to redistribute the budget inside some Ver(X). Moreover, if X belongs
to Disprover after a move, Ver(X) will not satisfy the property (?) and, since set(1) is connected to Check(X),
Runner would win. Therefore, either Saboteur does nothing, or he redistributes the budget inside some Ver(X)
where X belongs to Prover. If he has done nothing then after Runner has gone to set(2), by the same reasoning,
and by the necessity that at this moment the configuration is valid, one can ensure that again Saboteur does
nothing, in which case we would have val2 = val1. Let us focus on the case where Prover has performed some
redistribution in Ver(X). Without loss of generality, assume that when leaving v, the budget was placed on
X(1) and X(2), and after leaving set(1) the budget is on ¬X(1) and X(2). By the same reasoning, we know that
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after reaching set(2), Saboteur can only redistribute the budget inside a Ver(X ′) where X ′ belongs to Prover.
Furthermore, if X ′ 6= X then, when leaving set(2), Ver(X) would not satisfy (?) and the configuration would
not be valid. Therefore Saboteur can either choose to have the budget on X(1) and X(2), or on ¬X(1) and
¬X(2), therefore between val2 and val1 only the valuation of X may have change.
Runner modifies Disprover’s variables
From the vertex Play, Runner chooses a variable X of Disprover, and goes either to set(1)¬X or to set
(1)
X : assume
without loss of generality that he goes to set(1)X . Those two vertices have outgoing edges toward α and toward
Check(X ′) for all X ′ 6= X. Let val1 be the valuation associated with the valid configuration when Runner
leaves Play. After arriving in set(1)X , Saboteur can only redistribute the budget inside Ver(X). After arriving
in set(2)X , Saboteur is forced to reach a valid valuation, therefore if he has modified the budget distribution in
Ver(X), he must do it again in order for Ver(X) to satisfy (?). Furthermore, as set(2)X has outgoing edges to
the two final vertices X(1) and X(2), there must be a unit of budget on each of those vertices. Therefore, if we
let val2 be the valuation induced by the valid configuration when Runner leaves set(2)X , val2 must be equal to
val1 except possibly for X that must now be true.
Verifying a valuation
Before explaining the whole behaviour of the game, let us describe the verification process. As Verif is a valid
vertex, when Runner leaves this vertex, the configuration is valid: we therefore let val be the valuation induced
by this configuration. We show here that, from the moment Runner leaves Verif, Saboteur has a winning
strategy if and only if val satisfies the CNF formula. Let us first describe this part of the arena.
Verif has one outgoing safe edge toward each vertex χi associated with the eponymous clause. Those vertices
are connected to Check. Take a clause χi = at1 ∧ · · · ∧ at`. For each strict suffix of this clause containing at
least two atoms, i.e., for each sub-clause of the form atj ∧ · · · ∧ at` with 1 < j < `, create an eponymous vertex.
Then χi has a safe edge toward at(1)1 and a (non safe) edge toward the rest of the clause, i.e., nothing if ` = 1,
at
(1)
2 if ` = 2, and the vertex ‘at2 ∧ · · · ∧ at`’ if ` > 2. The same principle applies to the vertex ‘at2 ∧ · · · ∧ at`’,
etc. For example, take χ1 in the CNF formula Φ. The vertex χ1 has edges toward ¬A(1) and toward the vertex
‘B ∨¬C’ which is the rest of the clause. Then the vertex ‘B ∨¬C’ has an edge toward B(1) and an edge toward
¬C(1).
Assume first that val satisfies the formula, and let us see how Saboteur has a winning strategy. When
Runner reaches a clause χi, we know that it is true in val, i.e., that one of its atom is true. On the game, this
is represented by the fact that one of the atoms atj has non-zero budget on the two associated vertices at(1)j
and at(2)j . For example assume that Runner goes to χ1 and that B is true, i.e., there is some budget on B(1)
and B(2). Saboteur will use the budget on α to guide Runner in direction of this atom. In the example, when
Runner reaches χ1, Saboteur will put the budget on A(1), then when Runner will go to ‘B ∨¬C’, Saboteur will
move the same unit of budget on ¬C(1), forcing Runner to go to B(1). However, as there was already some
budget on B(1), Runner cannot leave ‘B ∨ ¬C’ without touching some non-zero budget, and loses the safety
game.
On the other hand, assume that val does not satisfy the formula and let us see how Runner has a winning
strategy. As the valuation does not satisfy the formula, there exists a clause χi that is false. Runner goes to this
clause. As it is false, all the atoms are false, in particular, in the game, for all atj , there is budget 0 on at(1)j .
Runner will have the following behaviour. If, after reaching χi, Saboteur has not put some budget on at(1)1 ,
then he goes there and wins, otherwise he goes to the vertex representing the rest of the formula. From there,
the same reasoning applies: if Saboteur has not put some budget on at(1)2 , then Runner goes there and wins,
otherwise he reaches the next sub-clause. At the end, Runner reaches the vertex ‘at(1)`−1 ∨ at(1)` ’, and whatever
Saboteur does, Runner reaches a final vertex with budget 0.
How the game works
When Runner leaves vertex Play, the configuration is valid; once he reaches set(1), the configuration is valid
again, and the difference with the previous one is that the valuation may have changed for at most one variable.
Once reaching Choose, Saboteur may also have changed the valuation of one of its variables. When Runner
reaches Choose, Saboteur can only redistribute the budget on α. One can easily see that he has no interest in
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changing the valuation by putting some budget in Ver(X) for some variable X, as at the next step he must put
the budget back on α. However, Saboteur can either put the free unit of budget on the edge (Choose, P lay),
forcing Runner to go to the verification part on the game, or put it on the edge (Choose,Verif), forcing Runner
to remain in the part of the game where they change the valuation. If Saboteur has a winning strategy in the
ABF game, he will apply it, and once the valuation satisfies the formula, he will force Runner to go to the
verification part. On the other hand, if the formula is never true, Saboteur is forced to prevent Runner from
going to the verification part (otherwise Runner would reach a final vertex as seen above), and the game will
last forever, allowing Runner to win.
I Example 13. Consider the formula given in Example 3, i.e., Φ = Cl1 ∧ Cl2 ∧ Cl3 ∧ Cl4 where Cl1 = A ∨ ¬C,
Cl2 = C ∨D, Cl3 = C ∨¬D and Cl4 = B ∨¬B. The ESPr constructed from Φ is given in Figure 5. Notice that
besides the variable vertices, there is one extra final vertex, α. In this construction, Saboteur plays the role of
Prover, whose variables are C and D, and Runner the one of Disprover whose variables are A and B.
For the sake of clarity, edges pointing towards α, as well as the two gadgets of Figures 3 and 4 are omitted.
Consider that from all vertices but the variable ones, one can check condition (i) for all variables, i.e., in
order not to lose, Saboteur maintain a non-zero budget on at least two vertices from Ver(x) for all variable x.
Furthermore, on the bottom right corner of nodes are written the variables for which one can check condition
(ii) and whether there is an outgoing edge pointing towards α, e.g., when Runner is in vertex set(1), Saboteur
must ensure that A and B satisfy condition (ii) and that there is a non-zero budget on α. In the following,
we consider those gadgets as constraints, considering that condition (i) always holds, and for example that if
Saboteur is in set(1) we are sure that (ii) holds in A and B and that there is a non-zero budget in α.
If we let n be the number of variables (here n = 4), let us set the budget to 2n+ 1 = 9. In this context, each
Ver(x) contains 2 units of budgets, and the remaining unit can be either on α, on the outgoing edge of Choose,
or on one of the variable vertices.
The initialisation gadget ensures that after some preliminary steps, Runner reaches vertex Play, and there
is one unit on α, and for each variable there are exactly two units of budget either on {¬x(1),¬x(2)} or on
{x(1), x(2)}, depending on the initial configuration of the ABF game.
Let us now focus on the upper part of the game. When Runner is on vertex Play, condition (ii) must be
satisfied for all vertices, and there must be one unit of budget on α, therefore the budget describes a valuation
of the variables, e.g., on Ver(A) either the two units of budget are on {¬x(1),¬x(2)} in which case we consider
that A is false, or on {x(1), x(2)} in which case A is true. Assume that A is false, and Runner wants to change
its valuation. Then, he goes to set(1)A where Saboteur has the possibility to move one unit of budget in Ver(A),
and then he goes to set(2)A . In this configuration condition (ii) must be satisfied for A. Furthermore if the two
units of budget are still on {¬A(1),¬A(2)}, then Runner wins by going on A(1), thus Saboteur has been force to
switch the two weights on {A(1), A(2)}. Then, a similar process allows Saboteur to modify the valuation of one
of its variables, when Runner goes through set(1) and set(2). Those steps simulate one round of the ABF game.
On vertex Choose, Saboteur may remove the budget on α and put it on one of the outgoing edges of Choose,
thus he can force Runner to go either on Play or on Verif. If Play is chosen, both players will simulate another
round of the ABF game. If it is Verif, then Runner goes to the lower part of the game.
In this part, Runner chooses a clause and then Saboteur can move the unit of budget that were on α. For
example, assume that Runner chooses Cl1. As there were a unit of budget on A(1), Saboteur can take the
budget of α to put in on ¬C(1) ensuring to win. Observe that the verification part of the game ensures that
Saboteur wins if, for each clause, at least one of the atoms is true. Indeed if it is the case, whatever clause is
chosen by Runner, Saboteur will be able, as seen above, to prevent Runner to play. On the other hand, if there
is a clause where both atom are false, it means than both outgoing edges point towards empty final vertices,
therefore whatever Saboteur does on the next step, Runner will be able to reach one of them, and thus win the
game.
C.2 Reduction from ESPr to SPr : proof of Lemma 5
We describe how to transform an extended QSG into a regular QSG. The transformation rids the original
sabotage game of its safe edges and final vertices, and replaces them with corresponding gadgets with the same
properties.
Final vertices are replaced by the gadget shown in Figure 6a. More formally, all edges incident in a final
vertex are replaced by edges incident on a copy of the gadget. A is the entry point of the gadget, i.e., any
edge pointing towards the final vertex in the extended QSG would now lead to A. Vertices C1 and C2 are both
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connected to αi, for all 1 6 i 6 B+1, and the αi’s form a clique of size B+1. It should be clear that, if Runner
reaches one of the αi, then he can ensure that the value of the play, from then onwards, is exactly 0. Indeed, as
there are B+ 1 outgoing edges, at least one of them has no budget on it; if Runner crosses this edge, he reaches
another αj where the same property holds. Thus, one can easily see that when Runner reaches A, he can win
if and only if there is no budget on either one of the edges: (A,C1), (A,C2).
Safe edges can be encoded as follows. Assume that we have a safe edge (A,C) in the extended QSG. To
encode it in a standard QSG (with final vertices, as we have already seen how to encode them), we add B + 1
vertices E1, . . . , EB+1, and B + 1 final vertices F1, . . . , FB+1. We remove the edge (A,C), and add the edges
(A,Ei), (Ei, Fi) and (Ei, C), for all i 6 B + 1. The gadget is depicted in Figure 6b. Runner has a strategy to
go from A to C without crossing an edge with non-zero budget, and forcing Saboteur to move at most one unit
of budget inside the game. That is to say, we have introduced one additional step to get from A to C, but we
will see that Saboteur cannot move more than one unit of budget on edges outside of the gadget, or he loses.
Indeed, when Runner leaves A, there must exist i such that there is no budget on edges (A,Ei), (Ei, Fi), (Ei, C)
nor on the final vertex Fi. If Runner goes to Ei, Saboteur must take a unit of budget and put it either on
(Ei, Fi) or on Fi, otherwise Runner can reach Fi and win. Now, Runner is able to reach C, and then Saboteur
can redistribute the budget as he wants.
C.3 Reduction from ThPrlsupfun(0) to SPr: proof of Lemma 7
Consider an instance I of the safety problem with underlying graph G(I) = (V,E), budget B, and a starting
vertex vI . We build a QSG G′ with graph G′ = (V ′, E′), initial vertex t1, budget B′, and cost function LimSup
as follows:
B′ = |E| ,
V ′ = V ∪ {sji | 1 6 i 6 B′ + 1, 1 6 j 6 B′} ∪ {xm | B + 1 6 m 6 B′} ∪ {t1, t2}
∪ {fk | 1 6 k 6 B} ∪ {e` | 1 6 ` 6 B + 1} ,
E′ = E ∪ {(ei, fj) | 1 6 i 6 B + 1, 1 6 j 6 B} ∪ {(fk, ek), (fk, ek+1) | 1 6 k 6 B}
∪ {(x`, tm) | 1 6 m 6 2, B + 1 6 ` 6 B′} ∪ {(tm, sB′i ) | 1 6 i 6 B′ + 1, 1 6 m 6 2}
∪ {(sji , sj−1i′ ) | 1 6 i, i′ 6 B′ + 1, 2 6 j 6 B′} ∪ {(s1i , em) | 1 6 m 6 2, 1 6 i 6 B + 1}
∪ {(em, u) | 1 6 m 6 B + 1, (vI , u) ∈ E} ∪ {(u, x`) | u ∈ V,B + 1 6 ` 6 B′}
∪ {(em, x`) | 1 6 m 6 B + 1, B + 1 6 ` 6 B′} .
Intuitively, the sub-graph of G′ defined by the vertices ei and fj form an initial gadget which ensures that
Runner can stay out of G(I) without paying, as long as there is some weight assigned to edges from E. We
also add an exit gadget consisting of the sub-graph of G′ defined by the xk vertices. These allow Runner to exit
from G(I) if Saboteur “cheats” by assigning more weights to edges from E than the original bound B. Both
gadgets are linked by a “safe path” formed by the vertices sji . Note that we add sufficiently many s
j
i so that,
for Runner, getting from any sB′i to any s1j is always possible without traversing a weighted edge.
We prove that Runner wins in I if and only if Val(G′) 6 0.
Assume first Runner wins I. In G′, he has no trouble following a path from t1 through the uji until he
arrives on some u1i with budget distribution w0 such that w0(u1i , ej) = 0, for some 1 6 j 6 B + 1, since there
are B′ + 1 vertices at each level of the safe path. On his next turn, he can then move to such an ej . As long
as the budget distribution has some budget assigned to some edge of E, there exists a vertex ek or x` with no
budget on either in-edges or out-edges, respectively. In the first case, Runner can go to such such an ek via
fk without paying anything. In the second case, Runner can get to t1 or t2 via x` and repeat the process, all
without paying. When the budget distribution has no weight assigned to edges of E, Runner can follow his
strategy from I – with the exception that he plays his first move from ej instead of vI – as long as Saboteur
keeps at most B budget units on edges of E. When this is no longer the case, say Runner is on a vertex u, with
budget distribution w1, that means there are at most B′ −B − 1 budget units on other edges, hence there is a
vertex x` such that w1(u, x`) = w1(x`, t1) = w1(x`, t2) = 0. Runner then moves to x`. On his next turn, he can
then move to either t1 or t2, following an edge with no weight on it. Then Runner can restart this strategy.
Assume now, that Saboteur wins I. From the start of the game, Runner will have to traverse one sji for all
j from B′ to 1. When Runner is on a vertex sji for j between B+ 1 and B′, Saboteur puts a budget unit on the
edge (xj , t1) and leaves it there. Similarly, when Runner is on a vertex uji for j between 1 and B, Saboteur puts
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a unit of budget back on the edge (fj , ej) and leaves it there. When Runner finally reaches some ek, Saboteur
passes. Then, if Runner goes to f` or xm, Saboteur can assign some budget to (f`, e`+1) or (xm, t2) and put
it back where it was after Runner’s next move, where he will inevitably cross a weighted edge, then wait until
Runner gets back to some ek. Alternatively, from ek, Runner can move to a vertex in G(I). In this case,
Saboteur follows his strategy from I, using budget units assigned to edges of the form (fk, ek) when needed,
until Runner crosses an edge of E with some weight on it or gets to some x`. In the latter case, Saboteur can
react the same way as if Runner was coming from ek. In the former case, Saboteur can start putting some
weights on all edges of E until Runner gets to some x`. If Runner never does, he will pay one at each step,
which is enough for Saboteur. Otherwise, Runner goes to some x`, then to t1 or t2, where Saboteur can restart
his strategy.
D Proofs of Section 4
D.1 Static threshold problem for Inf and LimInf is in PTIME: proof of Lemma 10
For Inf, we claim that Valstat(G) = b|E|/Bc, where E is the set of edges reachable from vI . Indeed, for a given
budget distribution δ, Runner simply goes towards the edge reachable from vI with the least budget possible;
therefore, Saboteur must place equal budget on each such edge. With a budget B, he can ensure b|E|/Bc on
every edge (some edges may contain a bigger portion of the budget, but some edges will always have at most
b|E|/Bc). Hence, deciding the static threshold problem for Inf amounts to computing the set E (can be done
in linear time with a depth-first-search algorithm), and checking whether |E| 6 B × (T + 1).
For LimInf, we must refine the study by considering strongly connected components. Precisely, we claim
that Valstat(G) = b|E˜|/Bc, where E˜ is the set of edges reachable from vI and contained in a strongly connected
component of the graph. Indeed, for a given budget distribution δ, Runner simply goes towards a cycle reachable
from vI containing an edge with the least budget b possible: he will visit infinitely often this edge, ensuring an
inferior limit at most b. Such a cycle is included in a strongly connected component, and reciprocally, every
edge of a strongly connected component is part of a cycle. Hence, Saboteur must secure equal budget on each
edge of every strongly connected components. Then, deciding the static threshold problem for LimInf amounts
to computing the set E˜ (can be done in linear time, e.g., with Tarjan’s algorithm), and checking whether
|E˜| 6 B × (T + 1).
D.2 Static threshold problem for Sup, LimSup, Avg and DS is coNP-complete: proof of
Lemma 11
For the membership in NP, we can first guess a budget distribution δ (that is of size polynomial), and then
compute the value of the one-player (since player Max has no choices anymore) quantitative game Gδ, to check
if it is greater than T : computing the value of such a game can be done in polynomial time for the four cost
functions we consider (see [1]).
To prove the NP-hardness for cost functions LimSup and Avg, we give a reduction from the following problem.
The Feedback arc set problem consists in, given as input a directed graph G = (V,E) and a threshold
k 6 |E|, determining whether there is a set E′ of k edges of G such that (V,E \E′) is acyclic. Karp showed in
[10] that the feedback arc set problem is NP-complete.
We now use the feedback arc set problem to prove the results of coNP-hardness of the static threshold
problem. Let us consider an instance of the feedback arc set problem, given by a directed graph G = (V,E)
and a natural integer k 6 |E|. We suppose, without loss of generality, the existence of a vertex vI , without any
in-going edges, and linked with an edge to every other vertex: since vI is not included in any cycle, the set E′
of the output of the problem has no interest at containing any of the edges added in this way.
We then construct a QSG G = (V,E, k, vI , f) with f ∈ {LimSup,Avg}. It is not difficult to show that
Valstat(G) > 0 if and only if there exists a set E′ of k edges of G such that (V,E \ E′) is acyclic. Indeed,
Valstat(G) > 0 implies that there exists a distribution δ ∈ ∆(G) such that for all strategies ρ of Runner,
f(piδρ,ι) > 0. Noticing that every vertex is reachable from the initial vertex vI , and considering memoryless
strategies of Runner (such that piδρ,ι ends with a simple cycle of the graph), we show that every cycle contains at
least one edge with a non-zero budget. The set E′ = {e ∈ E | δ(e) > 0} is then a valid output for the feedback
arc set problem. For the reciprocal implication, we simply assign a budget 1 to each vertex of the set E′.
The result for Sup and DS is then obtained by a slight modification of the previous proof. Let G =
(V ,E, k, vI , Sup) be the QSG obtained from G by transforming every edge (vI , v) into a safe edge (see Lemma 5).
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Without loss of generality, we can now assume that δ never assigns budget to the edges E \E. We also note that
vI has no in-going edges so that every play in G traverses a safe edge at most once. We claim that Valstat(G) > 0
if and only if there exists a set E′ of k edges of G such that (V,E \ E′) is acyclic. Indeed, if Valstat(G) > 0,
considering E′ = {e ∈ E | δ(e) > 0}, it is easy to show that (V,E \ E′) is acyclic: if not, Runner may simply
jump from vI , with a safe edge, to one of the vertices of a cycle of (V,E \E′), and then loop in this cycle forever,
without visiting any edge with non-zero budget. For the reciprocal implication, again, it suffices to assign a
budget 1 to each vertex of E′. The result for DSλ follows from the same reduction together with Lemma 6.
E Towards more expressive sabotage games
In this section we increase the expressiveness of the definition of sabotage games, and show that the threshold
problem for these new games are still in EXPTIME. The lower bound is immediate since they are extensions of
previous problems shown EXPTIME-hard in the rest of the article.
One can see a sabotage game as a system in which a controller tries to evolve while avoiding as much as
possible the weights put by Saboteur. The vertices of the graph represent configurations of the system, edges
represent the actions, and the budget of the Saboteur may represent several problems that can occur during the
execution. For example, it may describe a number of failures that can happen at the same time, or in a much
quantitative way, it may represent how much some elements of the systems are overload, and then how much it
would cost, in terms of time or energy, to use them.
We propose to look at sabotage as a particular semantics of systems. Based on the observation of Appendix B,
remember that one can define the semantics of a QSG G = (V,E,B, vI , δI , f) as a quantitative two-player gameJGK. If we split the model (the graph G = (V,E) with initial vertex vI), from the sabotage parameters (budget
B > 0, initial distribution δI ∈ ∆(E,B), and cost function f), we can define:
JGKB,δI ,f = J(V,E,B, vI , δI , f)K .
We have seen that the value of the QSG (V,E,B, vI , δI , f) is identical to the value of the quantitative two-player
game JGKB,δI ,f .
From a model point of view, graphs—which can be viewed as one-player games with trivial winning
conditions—are quite limited. In more realistic models, we may be interested as modelling systems with un-
controllable actions (i.e., as two-player games), and where the controller has a specific Boolean goal to achieve,
instead of simply visiting the graph ad vitam æternam. A more realistic goal is usually expressed via LTL for-
mulas, that can be modelled into qualitative games with parity winning conditions, as we show in the following.
E.1 Qualitative two-player games
As a complement of the quantitative two-player games defined in Appendix B, we now focus on qualitative
two-player games games. Consider a weighted arena G = (VMin, VMax, E, w, vI) as before. In the qualitative
setting, we are no longer interested in associating a value to each play (in particular, the weight function w is of
no use here), but simply stating whether a play is winning or not for a player. Formally, a winning condition is
a subset of V ω containing the set of winning plays. A qualitative game is a pair (G,C) consisting of an arena G
and a winning condition C. A play pi is declared winning for Min (respectively, for Max) if pi ∈ C (respectively,
pi 6∈ C). A strategy σp of player p is winning for p if all plays pi ∈ Play(σp) are winning; a play/strategy is losing
for player p otherwise. We say that player p wins (respectively, loses) the game if he has (respectively, does not
have) a winning strategy. Here are some usual winning conditions considered widely in the literature:
for all F ∈ V or F ∈ E, Reach(F ) is the set of plays that contain an occurrence of F .
for all F ∈ V or F ∈ E, Safe(F ) is the set of plays that do not contain any occurrence of F .
for all F ∈ V or F ∈ E, Büchi(F ) is the set of plays that contain infinitely many occurrences of F .
for all F ∈ V or F ∈ E, coBüchi(F ) is the set of plays that contain only finitely many (possibly none)
occurrences of F .
for all Col : V → N (such mapping is called a colouring function), Parity(Col) is the set of plays v0v1 · · ·
such that the greatest colour appearing infinitely often in the sequence Col(v0), Col(v1), . . . is even. Given a
colouring function Col, we let |Col| be the number of different colours of the vertices, i.e., |Col| = |{Col(v) |
v ∈ V }|.
for all value function f , and T ∈ R, Threshold6(f, T ) is the set of plays pi such that f(pi) 6 T .
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I Proposition 14. Qualitative two-player games with all winning conditions considered above are determined,
i.e., one player is winning if and only if his opponent is losing.
Proof. Martin’s determinacy theorem [14] applies here since all the above mentioned objectives are Borel
sets. J
E.2 Sabotage in parity games
In order to apply a sabotage semantics to qualitative game, where Min wants to satisfy a condition while
minimising a cost, one must study some mixture between qualitative and quantitative aspects. We see how
one can combine winning conditions and value functions, as introduced in [3]. Intuitively, in a weighted arena
G = (VMin, VMax, E, w, vI) with a winning condition C and a value function f , Min could want to satisfy C
while minimising f . We formalise this by building a new value function, denoted by C ∧ f , and defined by
C ∧ f(pi) = +∞ if pi 6∈ C, and C ∧ f(pi) = f(pi) otherwise. The quantitative two-player game (G,C ∧ f) now
contains the combination of both objectives.
We may finally introduce a sabotage semantics for parity games. Instead of deciding whether a player has
a winning strategy, which would be a standard semantics, we decide whether he has a winning strategy that
guarantees (or simply avoids in the case of a threshold 0) a certain threshold over the quantity of penalties
when the game is subject to failures.
Formally, given a two-player parity game G = ((VMin, VMax, E, vI),Parity(Col)), a budget B > 0, an ini-
tial distribution δI ∈ ∆(E,B), and a cost function f ∈ {Inf, LimInf, Sup, LimSup,Avg}, the B, δI , f-sabotage
semantics of G is the quantitative game
JGKB,δI ,f = ((V ′Min, V ′Max, E′, w, vcI),Parity(Col′) ∧ fw) ,
where :
V ′Min = VMin × ∆(E,B), and V ′Max = (VMax × ∆(E,B)) unionmulti (E × ∆(E,B)): with respect to the one-player
case of Appendix B, we add some vertices to player Max that has now in charge both the moves of the
environment (uncontrollable actions), and redistributions of Saboteur;
E′ = {((v, δ), (e, δ)) | e = (v, v′) ∈ E ∧ δ ∈ ∆(E,B)} ∪ {((e, δ), (v′, δ′)) | e = (v, v′) ∈ E ∧ δ . δ′};
w
(
(v, δ), (e, δ)
)
= w
(
(e, δ), (v′, δ′)
)
= δ(e);
vcI = (vI , δI) is the initial configuration;
Col′
(
(v, v′), δ
)
= Col′(v′, δ) = Col(v′).
To simplify our study, we do not consider the discounted-sum in this section. The threshold problem, describing
the cost that player Min can ensure, is then defined as previously.
I Definition 15 (Threshold problem for cost function f).
Input: A parity game (G,Parity(Col)), a budget B, an initial distribution δI ∈ ∆(E,B), and a threshold T ,
Output: Is there a strategy σ of Min such that Val(JGKB,δI ,f , σ) 6 T?
We are able to show that, even with the extension, the threshold problem stays in EXPTIME.
I Theorem 16. The threshold problem for cost functions Inf, LimInf, Sup, LimSup and Avg is in EXPTIME.
To prove this theorem, we first establish a crude (but sufficient) upper bound on the complexity of solving
quantitative games obtained by combining parity winning conditions and the previous cost functions.
I Proposition 17. There exists three polynomials p1, p2, p3 such that we can decide the threshold problem
of any quantitative game (G,Parity(Col) ∧ fw) with f ∈ {Inf, LimInf, Sup, LimSup,Avg} with a complexity in
O
(
p1(|w|) · p2(|V |)p3(|Col|)
)
.
Proof. We start with the case f = Avg. In [22, 1] it has been shown that one can decide who wins in a
qualitative game with a parity condition with a complexity in O(|V |2+|Col|). In [23], it has been shown that one
can compute the value of a quantitative game with an average cost function with a complexity in O(|w| · |V |5).
The combination has been studied thoroughly in [3]. There, it has been shown that if one can solve average cost
games in c1(|V |, |w|) and parity games in c2(|V |, |Col|), then one can solve games (G,Parity(Col)∧Avgw) with
a complexity in O(|V ||Col|(|V |2 + c1(|V |, |w|) + c2(|V |, |Col|)). By combining this result with the two above, we
obtain a complexity in O((|w|+ 1)|V |5+|Col|).
T. Brihaye, G. Geeraerts, A. Haddad, B. Monmege, G. A. Pérez, G. Renault 25
We then turn to the case f ∈ {Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup}. Our proof goes by encoding f into a qualitative
winning condition, and then using classical results of algorithmic game theory. Observe that deciding the
threshold problem in the game (G,Parity(Col) ∧ fw) amounts to solving the following problem:
Input: A weighted arena G = (VMin, VMax, E, w, vI), a colouring function Col, a threshold T ∈ Q
Output: Does Min have a winning strategy in (G,Parity(Col) ∩ Threshold6(fw, T ))?
The crucial remark is that, if we let F = {e ∈ E | w(e) 6 T}, we can rewrite the threshold sets for all payoff
functions as follows:
Threshold6(Infw, T ) = Reach(F ) , Threshold6(LimInfw, T ) = Büchi(F ) ,
Threshold6(Supw, T ) = Safe(E \ F ) , Threshold6(LimSupw, T ) = coBüchi(E \ F ) .
Notice that F is a subset of edges, and not vertices. However, it is easy to transform the problem into an
equivalent problem where F is indeed a subset of edges. Informally, it suffices to enrich the vertex set by letting
V ′ = V × {0, 1}, letting (vI , 0) the initial vertex instead of vI , and replacing each edge (v, v′) ∈ E by the set of
edges in E′:
{((v, 0), (v′, 0)), ((v, 1), (v′, 0))} if (v, v′) 6∈ F ;
{((v, 0), (v′, 1)), ((v, 1), (v′, 1))} if (v, v′) ∈ F .
Then, letting F ′ = V × {1} and Col′(v) = Col′(v, 0) = Col′(v, 1) = Col(v), allows us to keep track, in the
vertices, of whether the last seen edge is in F or not.
Now to conclude the proof, we describe two polynomials p1 and p2 such that deciding if Min can win qualit-
ative problem with a winning condition obtained by the intersection of a parity condition and another one from
{Reach(F ),Büchi(F ),Safe(F ), coBüchi(F )} with F ⊆ V can be done with a complexity in O(p1(V )p2(|Col|)).
We let G = (VMin, VMax, E, vI) the arena on which we play (the weight function is of no use anymore).
For Reach(F ) (respectively, Safe(F )), one can construct in polynomial time a parity game (G′ = (V ′Min, V ′Max,
E′, vI),Parity(Col′)) such that V ⊆ V ′, |Col′| 6 |Col| + 1, and Min wins in (G′,Parity(Col′)) if and only if
Min wins in (G,Parity(Col)∩Reach(F )) (respectively, (G,Parity(Col)∩Safe(F ))). For Safe(F ), we remove for
each vertex v ∈ F every outgoing edge in F , and add a self loop, colouring them with an odd colour. Hence,
if a play reaches such a vertex the play is losing, and otherwise, it is winning if and only if the greatest colour
seen infinitely often is even. For Reach(F ), we create two copies of the game. In the first copy, every colour is
odd, and for every vertex v in F the outgoing edges are modified to go to the same target but in the second
copy. In the second copy, nothing is changed. The play start in the first copy. In order to win, Min must go to
the second copy (otherwise the colour will always be odd), i.e., must reach a vertex in F and then the greatest
colour seen infinitely often must be even. As we have seen above parity games can be solved O(|V |2+|Col′|)
which concludes the proof for these cases.
For Büchi(F ) and coBüchi(F ), there exist two colouring functions Col′ and Col′′ such that: |Col′| = |Col′′| =
2, Büchi(F ) = Parity(Col′), and coBüchi(F ) = Parity(Col′′). Indeed, for v ∈ F , simply consider Col′(v) = 2
and Col′′(v) = 1, and for v 6∈ F consider Col′(v) = 1 and Col′′(v) = 0. Therefore solving a game with a winning
condition of the form Parity(Col)∩Büchi(F ) or Parity(Col)∩ (co)Büchi(F ) can be turned into solving a game
with a winning condition of the form Parity(Col)∩Parity(Col′) with |Col′| 6 2. Such games have been studied
in [4]. They have shown that they can be solved with a complexity in O(|V | + 2)5(|Col|+2)2), which concludes
the proof of the proposition. J
We can finally establish the complexity of solving sabotage parity games.
Proof of Theorem 16. From a parity game (G,Parity(Col)), a budget B, an initial distribution δI , and a
threshold T , one can construct JGKB,δI ,f = ((V ′Min, V ′Max, E′, w, vcI),Parity(Col′) ∧ fw) in exponential time.
Proposition 17 shows that we can decide who wins from (vI , δI) in this game with a complexity in O(p1(|w|) ·
p2(|V ′|)p3(|Col′|)).
We have |w| = B and |Col′| = |Col|. Furthermore |V ′| 6 |E| × |∆(B,E)|. As |∆(B,E)| 6 B|E| and
|E| 6 |V |2, we have |V ′| 6 |V |2 × B|V |2 . Since B is given in binary, we can suppose that B is at most
exponential in the size of the input of the problem, which, in summary, shows that we can solve the threshold
problem in exponential time. J
26 Quantitative Games under Failures
E.3 Sabotage semantics on LTL games
The linear temporal logic (LTL) is a logic whose formulas describe properties of infinite sequences of predicate.
More formally, given a game arena G, a mapping Pred from vertices to a set of predicate P and an LTL formula
φ, the winning condition φ(Pred) is the set of plays v0v1 · · · such that the sequence Pred(v0)Pred(v1) · · · satisfies
φ.
Solving LTL-games, with their standard semantics, is already 2-EXPTIME-complete [16]. The 2-EXPTIME
membership can be obtained by turning an LTL formula φ into a parity automaton whose size is doubly
exponential in the size of φ, and solving the parity game obtained by taking the product of the game arena with
the automaton.
When applying a sabotage semantics to an LTL game G, we obtain a game JGK of size exponential in the
initial arena, and whose value function is a combination of a cost function and the LTL formula. By applying
the same method as above, using the parity automaton associated with the formula and taking the product of
the automaton with JGK, we obtain a game whose size is doubly exponential in the size of G, and whose value
function is a combination of a cost function and a parity objective. Applying the above result, one can show
that this game can be solved in 2-EXPTIME with respect to the size of G.
As the standard semantics is equivalent to a sabotage semantics with budget 0, the problem remains 2-
EXPTIME-hard, and thus 2-EXPTIME-complete.
